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Risky Mail: 






 Early in the days of attorney-client email, David Hricik wrote a soothing law 
review article, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client Confidences By 
Internet E-mail, arguing that email had risks but could be assumed private for the purpose 
of professional ethics.  The ABA agreed in 1999, issuing a formal opinion that encrypting 
email was not required by ethical standards, and most jurisdictions followed suit.  The 
1999 ABA opinion persists today, despite being dangerously technology-specific, 
focused on almost obsolete technology, and over ten years later its legal foundation 
remains unsettled.  
 
 I present three reasons why attorneys should be concerned about the risks to 
confidentiality in attorney-client email: legal uncertainty about general privacy 
expectations for email, broad waivers of email privacy through provider policies, and 
unrelated disclosure by third parties.  Case-specific issues have become more important 
to determine ethical duties in confidential emails: manifold local privacy laws, local 
ethical standards, and provider policies. 
 
 At least one type of email, employer-provided email, is no longer considered 
confidential in this context, a known ethical hazard for attorneys.  In the context of 
Fourth Amendment law, email privacy remains unsettled, even after the landmark Sixth 
Circuit decision in Warshak.  Legal, authorized third-party access now poses a serious 
risk to confidentiality in attorney-client email. 
 
 Attorneys and clients need to understand these risks before informed consent is 
possible.  Technology-based solutions may be part of broader best practices to protect 
confidentiality.  Attorneys and clients must understand the technology at issue, rather 
than blindly risking clients’ confidences and their ethical duties on technologies they do 
not understand. 
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Warning: This e-mail, including all attachments is not 
encrypted.  Accordingly, it is possible for others to read and 
use this confidential information.  We take no 
responsibility for using unencrypted e-mail and this e-mail 
and related attachments may be deemed by the court to be a 
waiver of attorney-client privilege and the work-product 
doctrine.1 
 
This mocking warning is how a technologist sees lax email practice of attorneys, 
self-serving boilerplate with no corresponding action.2 Attorneys have been lulled into 
false security, risking clients’ most precious secrets.  In 2009, over 93% of attorneys used 
email to communicate privileged or confidential information.3 
 At the dawn of attorney-client email, Professor David Hricik wrote a calm, level-
headed law review article, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client 
Confidences By Internet E-Mail, published in 1998.4  Professor Hricik argued that email 
was not so dangerous, and could be relied on like phone calls or faxes, imperfect but 
assumed private. The corresponding ABA opinion, issued in 1999, agreed.5  Encryption 
was too much worry over email. 
 In 2005, Professor Hricik brushed up that opinion, again writing that email should 
be considered private.6  Since that time, local bar associations have refined and struggled 
with this position, while technology and law marched on.  The ABA modified its position 
in 2011, requiring attorneys to counsel and warn clients about employer emails and 
equipment.  While an excellent step forward, this discussion is still incomplete.  Even 
today, academics, practitioners, and bar associations rely on dated technology, outdated 
law, and incomplete assessment of risks.  The ABA’s 20/20 Committee on Ethics has 
proposed long-awaited reforms for 2012 showing the pressure and uncertainty of the 
situation, and offers some guidance, retreating somewhat from the obsolete 1999 
position. 
 Over ten years later, email privacy remains in a state of flux, balancing case-
specific policies and security risks, despite the ABA’s confident conclusions about broad 
email privacy back in 1999.  This shaky legal foundation is not stable enough for a 
client’s weighty matters and an attorney’s ethical duties.  Lawyers should consider all of 
the potential hazards in email to their ethical obligations and their clients’ confidences. 
                                                 
1 Jack Seward, Failure to Encrypt E-Mail Jeopardizes the Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine: Protect 
or Perish, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44, 44 (2006) (“One thing we can perhaps all agree on is that the 
following message is not going to be well-received by clients, and in all seriousness professionals are not 
about to use it, but bankruptcy professionals may indeed need to read it more than once.”) 
2 Id. 
3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT, WEB AND COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGY, 35 (2009). 
4 David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client Confidences By Internet E-Mail, 11 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459 (1998) [hereinafter Hricik 1998]. 
5 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) [hereinafter ABA 
99-413]. 
6 David Hricik & Amy Falkingham, Lawyers Still Worry Too Much About Transmitting E-Mail Over the 
Internet, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 265, 268 (2005) [hereinafter Hricik 2005]. 
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I am not concerned by malicious, illegal access in this context, or by careless 
attorneys sending email to the wrong users or losing devices, though surely both are 
problematic to an attorney’s ethical duties of confidentiality. 7  Careless misdirection and 
illegal, “hacker” invasion are known hazards.8  I am primarily concerned about the gray 
fog surrounding email’s particular confidentiality issues involving legal, authorized 
access by third parties, as well as evolving expectations in email privacy in legal and 
ethical standards. 
 Since 1999, at least one major category of email, employer-provided email, is no 
longer considered private in this context.  Third-party access has now become a known 
ethical issue for attorneys and clients, showing that expectations in email may be a case-
specific inquiry, depending on the provider’s privacy policy.  Attorneys using third-party 
systems should no longer rely on the ABA’s technology-specific assurance and should 
instead carefully consider the policies of third-party email services.  Attorneys now need 
to attempt to differentiate individual third-party providers with generally privacy-focused 
policies, like Yahoo,9 from services with less robust privacy protection.   
 In Part I of this Article, I explain the existing legal and technological framework 
for decisions about email security.  This section describes outdated understandings of 
technology, as well as the outdated statutes currently covering email.   
 Part II discusses the major ethical rulings in this area, starting with the ABA’s 
technology-specific 1999 ruling that email should be assumed private.  The updated view 
on email security in the more thoughtful State Bar of California’s 2010 opinion shows 
that the technology-specific assumptions in 1999 have become dangerous as technology 
evolved but ethical standards did not.  The ABA’s 2011 ethics opinion about employee-
provided email concedes that an entire category of email is no longer private, despite 
their broad conclusion in 1999.  Taken as a whole, these opinions show a turning point: 
case-specific factors about email now determine user expectations, not general principles. 
 Part III explores enduring issues in email confidentiality.  The expectation of 
privacy in email in the context of the Fourth Amendment remains unsettled, after over ten 
years.  The only federal appellate case on the issue finds a Fourth Amendment 
expectation of privacy, but not with respect to the ISP itself, and only after investigating 
                                                 
7 Hricik 1998, supra note 4, at 487-88(“In contrast, inadvertent transmission on an OSP does effect 
confidentiality, because the recipient most likely does not owe any duty whatsoever to the sender. In this 
regard, however, the potential for misdirection of e-mail is no different than it is with a fax: reasonable care 
can virtually eliminate any risk.”) 
8 See generally, Roland L. Trop & Sarah Jane Hughes, Red Skies in the Morning — Professional Ethics at 
the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. R. 111 (2011); Bill Piatt & Paula deWitte, Loose Lips 
Sink Attorney-Client Ships: Unintended Technological Disclosure of Confidential Communications, 39 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 781 (2008); Ash Mayfield, Decrypting the Code of Ethics: The Relationship Between an 
Attorney’s Ethical Duties and Network Security, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 547 (2007) (comment); ANDREW 
BECKERMAN-RODAU, Ethical Risks from the Use of Technology, 31 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L. J. 1 
(2004). 
9 I use Yahoo as an example of a responsible service provider with extensive privacy policies, based in part 
on its unpopular refusal to give the contents of an email account to the parents of a Marine killed in Iraq.  
See Claudia Buck, Digital Assets Are Often Forgotten When People Die, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 26. 2011, at 
C4.  However, even in that case, Yahoo lost and was forced to violate its own privacy policies.  I also use 
as examples other generally privacy-focused email providers: “free” providers such as Microsoft (Hotmail), 
Google (Gmail), or paid providers such as emails associated with Internet accounts for users, such as 
Comcast. 
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the provider’s policies.  Privacy policies themselves might contain broad waivers of 
privacy, which may surprise readers.  Finally, confidentiality is at risk when a third party 
makes an authorized disclosure, such as responding to information freedom laws or civil 
discovery. 
 Part IV considers technology-based solutions sensitive data, both as technical 
solutions and as markers of confidentiality.  Ethics opinions cannot endure with specific 
technology requirements.  Instead, attorneys need to be aware of technological risks in 
systems they use and weigh risks with their clients. 
 
I.  Background 
  
 Clients tell attorneys their most private, secret information, and attorneys have a 
solemn duty to protect clients’ confidences and keep their secrets.10  Confidentiality is the 
bedrock principle of legal ethics, and its duties are nearly absolute.11  Attorneys have an 
ethical and practical duty to safeguard their client’s information, and failure to do so may 
waive attorney-client privilege. 
 Confidentiality is an ethical duty for all attorneys.  All states have a version of 
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 in their ethics codes, requiring attorneys to 
safeguard their clients’ confidential information.12 Confidentiality applies to “all 
information relating to the representation, whatever its source.”13  Attorneys in all states 
have a duty to protect both privileged and confidential information, even when using 
email. 14  
 Rule 1.6(a) requires a lawyer to refrain from revealing “information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent.”15  This requirement is 
closely related to Rule 1.1 requiring “competent representation to a client,” which 
includes confidentiality.16  Comments to Rule 1.6 also require attorneys to take 
reasonable efforts to safeguard the information from their own agents, and from 
communicating confidential information to unintended recipients.17    
 These rules are not technology-specific, but instead show an attorney must use his 
professional judgment about the medium of communication and the risks to confidential 
information.  The rules also allow attorneys to rely on both law and contracts, or 
confidentiality agreements, in this ethical duty. An attorney may not disclose confidential 
information, subject to very limited exceptions.18   
Confidentiality is critical to protecting the privileged status of an attorney’s 
communications with clients.  Attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage clients’ 
honest and full disclosure without fear.19  The traditional elements of attorney client 
                                                 
10 See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3-9 (1998) 
(explaining confidentiality’s importance to lawyers and clients). 
11 Id. at 1. 
12 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6 (2009). 
13 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6 cmt. 3 (2009). 
14 Hricik 1998, supra note 4, at 478. 
15 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.6(a) (2009). 
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.1 (2009). 
17 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmts. 16, 17 (2009). 
18 See Fischel, supra note 10, at 1. 
19 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 US 383 (1981). 
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privilege are:  (1) where legal advice of any where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) 
from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relevant 
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at this instance 
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except 
the client waives the privilege.20  Because privilege is an obstruction to truth in a system 
generally designed to seek truth, privilege ought to be strictly confined.21  The relevant 
element here, present in all formulations of the elements, is confidentiality, and the risk 
of waiver when communications are not confidential.22 
Privilege protects communications which are “intended to remain confidential,” 
and are made in such circumstances that they are “reasonably expected and understood to 
be confidential.”23  Privilege can be waived by types of third-party access.  For example, 
a communication might not be confidential if the parties made no effort to prevent the 
communication from being overheard, or if the information is intended to reach other 
parties.24  Attorneys may waive privilege by sending information in a way that allows 
third parties to access it.25 
Courts and jurisdictions can vary wildly in determining when privilege is waived 
by third-party access, broadly using three different strategies: a strict test under which 
disclosure causes waiver, a lenient test which uses intent, or a middle-ground test, which 
most courts use.26  Courts can consider (1) reasonableness of precautions (2) number of 
inadvertent disclosures (3) extent of disclosure (4) measures to rectify the disclosure (5) 
any delay in taking those measures, and (6) overriding issues of fairness and justice.27 
Courts have varied slightly interpreting the requirements for confidentiality.  Some seem 
to follow a subjective, “intent” requirement, which others refer to circumstance 
“reasonably apparent.”28  Courts almost always inquire whether a reasonable person 
would have expected the communication to reach third parties, not the subjective state of 
mind of the communicator. 
Expectation of privacy is related but not identical to confidentiality in the context 
of privileged communication; communications may still be considered confidential even 
when they are not private.  A surreptitious eavesdropper, though compromising privacy, 
may not compromise confidentiality, assuming the attorney and client took reasonable 
                                                 
20 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (2003 reprint) 
21 Id. at § 2291(4). 
22 Other formulations of the traditional factors will also include confidentiality.  See, e.g., Restatement 
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68 (2000) (“(1) a communication (2) made between privileged 
persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.”) 
23 United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d. 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981). 
24 United States v. Gann, 732 F.2d. 714, 723 (9th Cir. 1984) (no privilege when statement made in presence 
of several searching police officers); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1358 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(intended public prospectus). 
25 Hricick considers this kind of waiver through sending email to the wrong parties.  See Hricik 2005, supra 
note 6, at 268. 
26 David S. Smallman, The Purloined Communications Exception to Inadvertent Waiver: Internet 
Publication and Preservation of Attorney-Client Privilege, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 715, 723 (1997). 
27 Id. 
28 Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers, §71, cmt. b (2000)(citing Esposito v. United States, 436 
F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir.1970) (“reasonable person”), United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441, 447 (2d Cir. 
1958), (“understood”)); Robert P. Mosteller & Kenneth S. Broun, The Danger to Confidential 
Communications in the Mismatch Between the Fourth Amendment’s “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” 
and the Confidentiality of Evidentiary Privileges, 32 CAMPBELL L. R. 147, 172-3 (2010). 
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steps to protect the communications.29  Sometimes, a known third party’s presence will 
not waive privilege.  For example, an attorney speaking to a client through a translator is 
not private, but would be considered confidential.30  An attorney speaking to a client with 
another privileged party, such as a spouse, would also not compromise privilege.31  
Recorded jail communications can also be privileged, despite the eavesdropper.32   
Privilege law can allow attorneys and clients to use reasonable efforts to create 
confidentiality in places where a reasonable expectation of privacy can never exist. An 
attorney may, with reasonable measures, speak confidentially to a client at a public 
restaurant, at a park bench, at a jail, or in a courthouse hallway.  All of these 
circumstances are outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 33  Privilege allows the speakers to construct a temporary space 
for confidentiality, using reasonable means to protect its confidentiality.  In such a space, 
the efforts of the parties are critical to establish confidentiality.34 
 
A. How Email Works 
 
The bedrock for the ABA and state decisions about encrypted email is Professor 
Hricik’s 1998 description of “Internet email,” then an emerging technology. 35  This 
conceptual understanding, before clouds and Wi-Fi and mobile broadband, fixes email as 
a technology far from its modern embodiment.  Though useful at the time, these facts are 
incomplete today. 
The Internet is a collection of hosts, such as home computers or servers in a data 
center, connected to a network of routers, devices that decide how to move information 
                                                 
29 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 71, Illustration 1 (2000) (“Client and Lawyer 
confer in Client's office about a legal matter. Client realizes that occupants of nearby offices can normally 
hear the sound of voices coming from Client's office but reasonably supposes they cannot intelligibly detect 
individual words. An occupant of an adjoining office secretly records the conference between Client and 
Lawyer and is able to make out the contents of their communications. Even if it violates no law in the 
jurisdiction, the secret recording ordinarily would not be anticipated by persons wishing to confer in 
confidence. Accordingly, the fact that the eavesdropper overheard the Client-Lawyer communications does 
not impair their confidential status.”) 
30 United States v. Kovel, 246 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (allowing confidentiality with necessary third 
parties). 
31 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 71(c) (2000) (“[I]n a jurisdiction that recognizes 
an absolute husband-wife privilege, the presence of a wife at an otherwise confidential meeting between the 
husband and the husband's lawyer does not destroy the confidentiality required for the attorney-client 
privilege.”) 
32 See U.S. v. Salyer, 2012 WL 507118 (E.D. Cal 2012) (determining privilege in calls made by a defendant 
in custody and recorded, based on content seeking legal advice); Restatement (Third) of Law Governing 
Lawyers, § 71, Illustration 3 (2000) (“A jailer requires Client, an incarcerated person, and Lawyer to confer 
only in a conference area that, as Client and Lawyer know, is sometimes secretly subjected to recorded 
video surveillance by the jailer. If Client and Lawyer take reasonable precautions to avoid being overheard, 
the fact that the jailer secretly records their conversation does not deprive it of its confidential character.”) 
33 Mosteller & Brown, supra note 28, at 155. 
34 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 71, Illustation 2 (2000) (based on Schwartz v. 
Wenger, 124 N.W.2d 489 (Minn. 1963) (allowing eavesdropper testimony because client and attorney 
made no effort to ensure secrecy in courtroom hallway conversation)). 
35 Hricik 1998, supra note 4, at 461-465 (“E-mail programs send correspondence from one personal 
account to any Internet machine.” “Significantly, for the reasons discussed below, when I log onto AOL, 
my computer is connected directly over a phone line to AOL.”) 
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through the network.36 Routers can be as simple as the home variety that often provide 
Wi-Fi wireless networking or as complex as the cabinet sized core routers in major 
Internet exchange points. For a host to send information to a particular other destination 
host, it must first split the information into short segments called “packets.” The host 
directly connects to its local router and sends each packet to the local router along with 
the intended destination.37 
The router forwards the packet based on the destination to another router it 
believes is closer to the destination. The process continues until the packet reaches a 
router that is directly connected to the destination host, which simply forwards it to the 
host.   Any intermediate router will be able to read the contents of an unencrypted 
packet.38  The packets contain a sequence number and other information that allows the 
receiving host to reassemble the original, complete message. 
This style of decentralized routing is called "packet-switched networking" and 
allows the Internet to continue to operate even when some of the links in the network fail 
because packets will simply take a different path.39  Neither the sender nor any router 
controls which full path any packet takes over the network, and each packet may take a 
completely different path even for the same message.  This routing also makes it 
impossible to predict the route of any particular message or any packet with certainty.  
The decentralized network of the Internet differs from a circuit-switched network, such as 
the historical telephone network.40  In a circuit-switched network, the entire message will 
follow the same path, and the connection will be dedicated that communication for a 
finite period of time.41 
In 2008, users believed that the email traveled to a personal computer, like a 
physical mailbox, where it stopped:42 
 
Thus, if I send an e-mail message form my AOL e-mail 
address to my Baker & Botts e-mail address, AOL merely 
sends the message through its host onto the Internet.  The e-
mail is then routed over the Internet to Baker & Botts’ host 
computer, where it is then routed by that computer to my 
mailbox.  I can then complete the transmission by logging 
                                                 
36 See ANDREW S. TANENBAUM & DAVID J. WETHERALL, COMPUTER NETWORKS, § 1.5 (5th ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter COMPUTER NETWORKS]. 
37 Id. at 355–63 ([“T]he network layer must know about the topology of the network (i.e. the set of all 
routers and links) and choose appropriate paths through it, even for large networks.”) 
38 Hricik 1998, supra note 4, at 9. 
39 COMPUTER NETWORKS, supra note 36, at 162-4 (“With packet switching there is no fixed path, so 
different packets can follow different paths, depending on the network conditions at the time they are sent, 
and they may arrive out of order. . . . With packet switching, packets can be routed around dead switches.”) 
40 Id. at 9–10. 
41 COMPUTER NETWORKS, supra note 36, at 161–2 (“[O]nce a [phone] call has been set up, a dedicated path 
between both ends exists and will continue to exist until the call is finished.  An important property of 
circuit switching is the need to set up an end-to-end path before any data can be sent.”) 
42 Daniel J. Pope & Helen Whatley Pope, Is It Safe…, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 138, 141 (1997) (“Unlike web 
pages, e-mail addresses are accessible only by the mailbox owners and by those responsible for maintaining 
the computer system in which the mailbox resides.  Anyone can send to an e-mail address, but only its 
owner, or one with the password to the mailbox, can access what has been sent.  In this way, e-mailboxes 
are similar to post office boxes-without the key, you can’t get in.”) 
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onto my Baker & Botts e-mail mailbox, providing my 
password for my Baker & Botts mailbox and downloading 
the message to the computer in my office.43 
 
  When Professor Hricik wrote his article, this description was more or less true, 
as AOL, like most service providers, deleted mail off its servers after a few days to save 
on then-expensive storage.  In 1997, “(i) The current [deletion] default is about two (2) 
days after it is read. E-mail that is sent but not read is permanently deleted from the 
system after about twenty-five to thirty (25-30) days. (Consequently, to keep copies of 
any communications, you should store them on your personal computer hard drive or in 
print form.)”44  Today’s AOL terms of service are silent on the deletion issue, suggesting 
they could keep a copy of everything coming in or out of an email account forever. 
When Professor Hricik accessed his AOL mail in 1998, he used a program 
running on his computer called a mail client.  Well-known, stand-alone mail clients are 
common today as well, such as Microsoft Outlook.  These programs allow the user to 
store a copy of the mail on his own device, and the mail client accesses the mail from the 
device’s storage, transferring incoming and outgoing mail to the server.  Today, many 
companies use these clients with their own internal servers that perform mail exchange in 
an internal network.  Today, there is no “Baker & Botts’ host computer,” there will be 
many in an internal network which many attorneys can access from many locations, 
through internal networks as well as the Internet through secured connections. 
Another common method of accessing mail is using an email client within a 
webpage.  This type of access to email through an Internet site is called “webmail.”  
Corporate off-site mail and services like Gmail or Yahoo use this type of access. For 
these services, data is accessed, stored, and sent to off-site computing and storage 
facilities, commonly called “the cloud.”45  The operator of the cloud would, technically 
speaking, be able to view any unencrypted message stored in its servers.  The data may 
also be stored temporarily in storage such as a browser cache when accessed by a user. 
Today, cloud computing is common for many Internet users, not just mysterious 
system administrators. Users store data in clouds, from photos to emails to online gaming 
profiles.46  Sophisticated corporations store their data using expensive, complex networks 
with the highest security; 45 percent of multi-national companies were using some form 
                                                 
43 Hricik 1998, supra note 4, at 465. 
44 Id. at 488–89. 
45 Paul Lanois, Privacy in the Age of the Cloud, 15 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2011); COMPUTER NETWORKS, 
supra note 36, at 672–3 (“Nowadays, much of the excitement around the Web is using it for applications 
and services.  Examples include buying products on e-commerce sites, searching library catalogs, exploring 
maps, reading and sending email, and collaborating on documents.  These uses are like traditional 
application software (e.g., mail readers and word processors).  The twist is that these applications run inside 
the browser, with user data stored on servers in Internet data centers.  They use Web protocols to access 
information via the Internet, and the browser to display a user interface.  The advantage of this approach is 
that users do not need to install separate application programs, and user data can be accessed from different 
computers and backed up from the service operator.  It is proving so successful it that it is rivaling 
traditional application software.  Of course, the fact that these applications are offered for free helps.  This 
model is the prevalent form of cloud computing, in which computing moves off individual desktop 
computers and into shared clusters of servers in the Internet.”) 
46 Id. at 3-4. 
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of cloud computing in 2011.47  Of course, cloud computing has its own risks and ethics 
issues, yet to be decided, especially if maintained by a third party.48  It also has security 
and privacy only as good as the provider allows.  At a minimum, cloud based solutions 
risk the problem of inconsistent jurisdictional rules on privacy and inconsistent cross-
national standards.49 
Users can access webmail services for email using many kinds of web-based 
applications, mail applications, and smartphone applications.  For example, a user could 
access Google’s Gmail through any major browser, as well as through specially designed 
Gmail mobile programs or through iPhone’s mail application, configured for that 
account.  Often, users access the data using only the cloud, storing nothing on their own 
computers.  Others still use Professor Hricik’s model and download data to their 
computers after deleting the server copy, leaving an archival copy or perhaps no copy at 
all for the mail provider.  It is possible to use a webmail service exactly as Professor 
Hricik described in 1998, or to access data only through webmail, or to store copies on 
both a computer and on the cloud.  
 Professor Hricik believed email could not be searched or even stored by a service 
provider.50   Because mail was so quickly deleted, no copy persisted to search.51  He was 
right, then.  Today email may be stored long-term in the cloud, which is easy to search 
and often must be searched.  It may even exist without a user’s knowledge as an archival 
or back-up copy.  Providers regularly search email to monitor spam, to monitor 
employee’s personal use, to provide targeted advertising, or to enforce terms of service.  
When Professor Hricik sends a message to his Baker Botts account from AOL today, 
both likely keep multiple copies on multiple servers.  They may even store archival 
snapshots of the servers for back-up purposes, in multiple locations, which may be in 
neither Baker Botts’ Texas headquarters nor AOL’s Virginia headquarters.  They may not 
even be stored in the United States. 
The common persistence of that data, unlikely in the 1990s, may leave a complete 
record.  Justice Brandeis observed in dissent for a case in a wiretapping precedent to 
Katz, "[w]ays may some day be developed by which the government, without removing 
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled 
                                                 
47 Id. at 3. 
48 See generally Nicole Black, CLOUD COMPUTING FOR LAWYERS (2012) (published by the ABA).  The 
ABA’s 20/20 Commission issued a paper for comment in 2010 which included issues about cloud 
computing, but has not yet addressed those issues in formal recommendations.  See ABA Comm. on Ethics 
20/20, Issues Paper Concerning Client Confidentiality and Lawyers’ Use of Tech., Sept. 20, 2010. 
49 Lanois, supra note 42, at 10.  Though not strictly “email,” message delivery within a cloud is how many 
secure environments, such as banks or medical providers, correspond with users.  Readers may be familiar 
with a generic email from a secure provider notifying users to log in to their account to read their message, 
perhaps for a banking alert or a medical bill.  For example, a bank might notify a user of a bill or 
transaction by email or text message.  However, the message will direct the user to the bank’s secure web 
portal to view details.  Thus, the provider secures the message by the user’s authentication and access 
methods.  Many law firms or corporate clients already have similar mailboxes to store secure messages.  
50 Hricik 1998, supra note 4, at 472–73 (“As with the WWW, a third-party with access to a law firm’s 
database could, for example, search by client’s name, or a specific topic, and locate such documents.  The 
same is true for information on the WWW, but it is not true for Internet e-mail.”) 
51 Id. at 473 (“[T]he concerns present when a law firm gives access of its database to a third party are not in 
any way reasonably analogous to transmitting e-mail.”) 
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to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.”52  Today, complete 
copies of emails may be commonly kept at both the sending and receiving end. 
Professor Hricik and the ABA categorized email into four categories: direct email, 
private system email, “on-line service,” and “Internet e-mail.”53  The first category, direct 
email, is considered an email sent from one modem to another, or “[t]he modem simply 
converts the content of the e-mail into digital information that is carried on land-based 
phone lines to the recipient’s modem.”54  “This is virtually indistinguishable from 
sending a fax.”55 In 2005, Professor Hricik suggests this is possible using two dial-up 
connections and that the direct phone line will protect the communication.56  Today, such 
a connection for email is unlikely outside a private network. 
The second category, “private system e-mail,” persists today as the most secure.57  
In 1998, Professor Hricik describes a local network using local proprietary connections 
called a LAN, as opposed to the Internet at large.  This secure network is how most 
offices operate today.58  Professor Hricik also describes offsite access when a “lawyer’s 
network dials that client’s network directly over land-based phone lines and transmits the 
message.”59  Professor Hricik claimed this communication never used “external phone 
lines” to access the private network.60 
In 2005, Professor Hricik presented a more modern version of accessing private 
networks through Virtual Private Networks (VPN) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).61  
Both VPN and SSL require certificates that provide a secure “tunnel” through the Internet 
using encryption and authentication requirements.62  Packets that are intercepted by 
intermediate routers would be unintelligible.  Both SSL and VPN applications may use 
“external phone lines” and the Internet at large, but can secure data in the transit network 
using additional security measures, always including encryption, and typically requiring 
authentication of one or both end points. 
Readers today are likely quite familiar with SSL technology, commonly used by 
“secure” websites like banks.  Readers are likely familiar with a cartoon lock on their 
browser indicating a connection like SSL, or newer protocols today, such as TLS.  
Readers may also be familiar with VPN, which requires special software to allow a user 
to remotely log on to a secure network.  Many firms and companies use this kind of 
software and even more security, such as dynamic passwords on key chains.  Today’s 
private networks and remote access are commonly used to communicate and secure 
email. 
                                                 
52 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis dissent). 
53 ABA 1999, supra note 5 at 6–7; Hricik 1998, supra note 4, at 485–492. 
54 ABA 99-413, supra note 5, at 6. 
55 Id. 
56 Hricik 2005, supra note 5, at 272. 
57 ABA 99-413, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
58 COMPUTER NETWORKS, supra note 36, at 19–23 (“LANs are widely used to connect personal computers 
and consumer electronics to let them share resources (i.e. printers) and exchange information.  When LANs 
are used by companies, they are called enterprise networks.  Wireless LANs are very popular these days, 
especially in homes, older office buildings, cafeterias, and other places where it is too much trouble install 
cables.”) 
59 Hricik 1998, supra note 4, at 486–7. 
60 Id.  
61 Hricik 2005, supra note 5, at 279–80. 
62 COMPUTER NETWORKS, supra note 36, at 26, 853–5 (explaining VPN and SSL). 
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The third category, “on-line service providers,” is shorthand for an email address 
provided by an Internet Service Provider.63  In the 1990s, this email would be furnished 
as part of a paid service to access the Internet, thus AOL would be both the mail provider 
and the ISP.64  This same identity would persist over other AOL’s private services, 
identifying the user based on a screen name.65  At that time, Professor Hricik would have 
used a dial-up connection to connect to AOL’s proprietary network, or “online” service, 
and he may have then connected the Internet through AOL.  Messages sent directly to 
AOL could use the dial-up connection to AOL’s “online” services, not the Internet. 
Professor Hricik relies on AOL policies and the law at the time to suggest that an 
attorney can rely on this service to send a message to an “online” client who is using the 
same service.66  Note in that case, the attorney’s dial-up connection and email would be 
provided by AOL, as would the client’s.  Today, a user could still have an email assigned 
by their service provider, such as Comcast, but distinct mail providers are more common, 
such as Google or Hotmail, and such communication would generally include the 
Internet.  Today, this situation is unlikely outside a private network. 
The fourth type, “Internet E-Mail,” is email communicated by an Internet 
provider but using a separate mail service.67  Today, we would consider this most mail 
outside a private network.  Today, users commonly use a third-party Internet service 
provider, such as Comcast, to communicate mail from another mail service, such as 
Gmail. 
Professor Hricik at that time relied heavily on “land-based phone lines,” where he 
believed messages moved.68  Lawyers in the days of dial-up could connect directly 
through phone lines,69 as Professor Hricik remembered in 2005.70  Today, outside of a 
private network, email goes through multiple servers and routers and is sent over fiber-
optic cabling with mixed purpose, including television, phone, and Internet data. 71 
Professor Hricik always knew the first stop on his email’s journey, the initial 
router that was installed at AOL and dialed into by his home modem, or by Baker Botts at 
his office.  Today, Professor Hricik could send the same emails using WiFi, or he could 
use his phone, tablet, or computer on mobile broadband.72 
Using any of these services, he could access his email from the mail provider’s 
cloud, using a web client to access a cloud instead of a mail client.  These messages may 
                                                 
63 Hricik 1998, supra note 4, at 487–88 
64 Id. at 464–65. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 492. 
67 ABA 99-413, supra note 5, at 8-9. 
68 Id. at 9 (“[Because] Internet e-mail typically travels through land-based phone lines, the only points of 
unique vulnerability consist of the third party-owned Internet services providers or ‘ISPs.”)   
69 Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, The Internet: New Dangers of Ethics Traps, 56 OR. ST. B. BULL 17 
(1995) (“If a lawyer’s computer and a clients computer communicate directly over the phone lines and not 
through a third-party computer, the fact that the lawyer and the client are communicating in bits and bytes 
rather than by voice should not affect the availability of attorney-client privilege.”); David Hricik, 
Confidentiality and Privilege in High-Tech Communications, 60 TEX. B. J. 104, 110 (1997). 
70 Hricik 2005, supra note 6, at 272 (“E-mail can also be sent directly over land-based phone lines, from 
one computer to another.  When –mail is sent this way, it is no different than sending a fax.”) 
71 Id. at 277. 
72 See COMPUTER NETWORKS, supra note 36, at § 1.5.2 (Third Generation Mobile Phone Networks), § 1.5.3 
(Wirless LASs:802.11). 
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or may not use wireless services, and they would then use modern fiber-optic cables and 
innumerable networking equipment like routers and switches along the way in unknown 
jurisdictions. 
B. Privacy Statutes for Email: ECPA 
To understand the email privacy requires discussing the dated federal privacy 
laws that law enforcement, courts, and attorneys consult to determine these rights.  Two 
types of laws can apply to email, those targeted at real-time interceptions, such as 
wiretapping, as well as those intended for access of communications in storage at a later 
date.  
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was enacted in 1986 to 
amend Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which 
prevented wiretapping.73 ECPA was intended to protect privacy in new communication 
mediums and had wide support.74   ECPA has not been amended since, despite growing 
criticism, in the context of email and many other applications.75  The 1986 amendments 
had two chapters relevant here: the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act 
(SCA).  
The Wiretap Act establishes criminal and civil liability for “any person who … 
willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or 
endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication” as well as any use, 
disclosure, or attempted use of such interceptions.76   This was intended to protect “the 
privacy of electronic communications by prohibiting their unlawful interception while in 
transit from unauthorized interception.”77  Like previous wiretap provisions, ECPA 
states that intercepted messages do not lose their privileged character because of its 
statutory authority.78  ECPA in itself has no authority regarding privilege.  
The Wiretap Act exempts interceptions “where one of the parties to the 
communication has given prior consent to such interception” and disclosure by a service 
provider “with the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or intended 
recipient.”79  ECPA also exempts communications services providers, if they use 
intercepts “in the normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity which 
is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or 
property of the provider of that service.”80 
The Stored Communications Act covers messages in storage.   SCA established 
liability for a person who “intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through 
which an electronic communication service is provided” or “intentionally exceeds an 
authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized 
access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.”81  
                                                 
73 Yvette Joy Liebesman, The Potential Effects of United States v. Councilman on the Confidentiality of 
Attorney-Client E-Mail Communications, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 893, 899 (2005). 
74 Id. at 902–03. 
75 Miguel Helft & Claire Cain Miller, News Analysis: 1986 Privacy Law is Outrun by the Web, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 9, 2011. 
76 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006). 
77 Liebesman, supra note 67, at 900. 
78 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) (2006). 
79 18 U.S.C. §  2511(2)(d); 2511(3)(b)(ii) (2006). 
80 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(1) (2006). 
81 Liebesman, supra note 67, at 901; 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2006). 
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Service providers have an exemption from the Stored Communications Act to 
access stored communications.82  However, it is a crime for ISPs to disclose stored 
communications, generally speaking,83 subject to several exceptions similar to the 
Wiretap Act, including “as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or 
to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service.”84  Service 
providers can also disclose communications with consent “of the originator or an 
addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or the subscriber in the case of 
the remote computer service.”85  Government entities, such as law enforcement, have 
abilities to compel disclosure within ECPA, discussed later, which do not apply to private 
entities, such as service providers.86 
 
II. Ethics Opinions Regarding Email 
 
In the late 1990s, attorneys became concerned about the then-emerging 
technology of email, and local bar associations responded.  The South Carolina Bar 
issued the earliest opinion about email encryption in 1995, which prohibited e-mail as 
insecure and required a client’s approval. However, a second 1997 opinion required only 
expectation of privacy and allowed email if encryption is was discussed between the 
client and lawyer.  “A lawyer should discuss with a client such options as encryption in 
order to safeguard against even inadvertent disclosure of sensitive or privileged 
information when using e-mail.”87 
Other local bar associations found encryption unnecessary in the late 1990s: 
Alaska, District of Columbia, Illinois, Kentucky, New York City, New York State, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Vermont, though often with a requirement to 
inform clients.88 Some bar associations required more caution, in the form of specific 
types of consent or technological protections.89   
                                                 
82 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (2006). 
83 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006). 
84 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(5) (2006). 
85 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2006). 
86 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006). 
87 South Carolina Ethics Opinion 94-27 (1995); South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. No. 97-08 
(1997). 
88 Alaska Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 98-2 (1998) (“While it is not necessary to seek specific client consent to 
the use of unencrypted e-mail, clients should nonetheless be advised, and cautioned, that the 
communications are not absolutely secure.”); District of Columbia Bar Ass’n, Op. 281 (1998);  Ill. State 
Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct No. 96-10 (1997); Kentucky Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. KBA E-403 
(1998) (,”[A] lawyer does not violate Rule 1.6 by communicating with a client using electronic mail 
services, including the Internet, without encryption. Nor is it necessary, as some commentators have 
suggested, to seek specific client consent to the use of unencrypted e-mail.”); The Ass’n of the Bar of the 
City of New York, Formal Op. 1998-2 (1998) (“Different levels of security on the Internet as well as off 
the Internet would seem to be appropriate for matters of differing sensitivity. But we do not believe that a 
blanket prohibition on the use of e-mail for client communications is either necessary or appropriate.”); 
New York State Bar Ass’n , Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Opinion 709 (1998); State Bar Ass’n of N. Dakota, 
Ethics Comm., Op. 97-00 (1997) (“[R]outine matter with clients and/or other lawyer jointly representing 
clients via unencrypted e-mail carries adequate assurances, and/or a reasonable expection, or 
confidentiality.”); Orange County Bar Ass’n Professionalism and Ethics Comm., Formal Op. No. 97-002 
(1997) (“The use of encrypted email is encouraged, but not required.”); Vermont Bar Association, 
Advisory Ethics Op. 97-05 (1997) (“The Committee believes that any lawyer may use e-mail and the 
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In the 1990s, courts encountered little privileged email, and had made only a 
handful of isolated rulings in otherwise routine cases that email could be used for 
privileged material.90  In 1995, the American Bar Association tackled “rapidly 
developing technology.”91  In Formal Opinion 95-398, the ABA considers maintenance 
of networks and “terminals” containing clients’ information.92  The ABA states that when 
non-attorney access client files in this context, attorneys must supervise the relationship 
to ensure that the non-attorneys understand their obligations and “make reasonable efforts 
to ensure that the service provider will not make unauthorized disclosures of client 
information.” 93 
This is consistent with guidance for Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 and 
with practices concerning third-party access to attorney data.  Opinion 95-398 also 
references Rule 5.3, Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants. This rule requires 
firms to establish policies to uphold confidentiality requirements, and attorneys must 
ensure that nonlawyers behave appropriately.  Opinion 95-398 found that “a lawyer 
might be well-advised to secure from the service provider in writing, along with or apart 
from any written contract for services that might exist, a written statement of the service 
provider’s assurance of confidentiality.”94  The ABA applied this rule to outsiders hired 
by attorneys, from accounting, to photocopying, to paper disposal, and to technical 
vendors with access to confidential databases.95 
 
A. ABA Formal Opinion 99-413 
 
In 1999, Inspired by Professor Hricik’s calming assurances that email should be 
assumed private, ABA responded to the patchwork ethical opinions with Formal Opinion 
No. 99-413, declaring that email encryption was generally not necessary to protect client 
confidence:96 
 
A lawyer may transmit information relating to the 
representation of a client by unencrypted e-mail sent over 
the Internet without violating the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (1998) because the mode of 
                                                                                                                                                 
internet.”) 
89 State Bar of Arizona Ethics Op. 97-04 (1997) (“Lawyers may want to have the e-mail encrypted with a 
password known only to the lawyer and client so that there is no inadvertent disclosure of confidential 
information.”); Iowa Bar Ass’n Op. 1997-1 (1997); Missouri Informal Advisory Opinions 990007, 980029, 
970230, and 970161; Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. On Legal Ethics Op. 97-130 (lawyers must obtain consent to 
use unencrypted email); N.C. Proposed Op. RPC 215 (Apr. 13, 1995). 
90 Amylin Pharma., Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 1998 WL 849078 (1998); International Marine 
Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 1997 WL 160371 * 3 (S.D.N.Y 1997); National Employment Service Corp. 
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 1994 WL 878920 * 3 (Mass. Super. 1994). 




94 Id. at 2. 
95 The ABA issued an almost identical opinion in 2008, adding some requirements for outsourcing 
attorneys.  ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Opinion 08-451 (2008). 
96 See ABA 99-413, supra note 5, at 1. 
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transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy 
from a technological and legal standpoint. The same 
privacy accorded U.S. and commercial mail, land-line 
telephonic transmissions, and facsimiles applies to Internet 
e-mail. A lawyer should consult with the client and follow 
her instructions, however, as to the mode of transmitting 
highly sensitive information relating to the client's 
representation.97 
 
The ABA cited to Professor Hricik constantly, in thirteen footnotes out of fourty.98  The 
ABA compared email to many other forms of communication: commercial and U.S. mail, 
telephones, cordless and cellular phones, and facsimile.99 The ABA found that email was 
technically insecure, like other means of transmission, but that “interception or 
dissemination is a violation of the law,” as with other technologies.100 
The ABA addressed third-party access to email, when provided through an OSP, 
at that time a service like AOL.  The ABA suggests that the security policies, protection 
from outside hackers, and privacy policies restricting internal OSP access, could affect 
whether a user has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The ABA then generalizes 
providers in the category of AOL to have “a formal policy that narrowly restricts the 
bases on which system administrators and OSP agents are permitted to examine user 
email,” that is a privacy policy that protects the user’s privacy, as AOL’s did.101 
The ABA also claims that “irrespective of the OSP’s formal policy” access is 
limited by law.  The ABA cites federal law discussed later to claim that “federal law 
imposes limits on the ability of ISP administrators to inspect user e-mail, irrespective of 
the OSP’s formal policy.  Inspection is limited by ECPA . . . Further, . . . disclosure of 
those communications for purposes other than those provided by the statute is 
prohibited.”102  The ABA confidently concluded that “[t]he same privacy accorded U.S. 
and commercial mail, land-line telephonic transmissions, and facsimiles applies to 
Internet e-mail.”103 
As with similar opinions, the ABA suggested an exception that threatened to 
swallow the entire rule.   Attorneys should consult their clients when “information being 
transmitted is so highly sensitive that extraordinary measures to protect the transmission 
are warranted.”104 
It is difficult to overstate experts’ reliance on ECPA for the expectation of 
privacy.  Hricik, the ABA, and state bars all explicitly rely on ECPA protections to 
support a reasonable expectation of privacy.105  The ABA states that it is unreasonable to 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 3–6. 
100 Id. at 1. 
101 Id. at 7. 
102 Id. at 8. 
103 Id. at 1. 
104 Id. at 10. 
105 Liebesman, supra note 67, at 894. 
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avoid unencrypted email “when unauthorized interception or dissemination of the 
information is a violation of the law.”106 
Professor Hricik is deeply concerned with malicious interception, and he uses 
ECPA to show an expectation of privacy in this type of hacker interception.107  I agree 
with him on this point, but not on his broad categorization of ECPA as a water-tight 
barrier to an third party’s inspection of private emails.108  The ABA, at least in 1999, also 
rests on ECPA as protecting communications, emphasizing the business requirements as 
limiting and protective for users, from ECPA.109 
Shortly after, many local bar associations followed the ABA’s lead and issued 
opinions that encrypted email was not necessary to comply with ethical obligations, often 
with a requirement to warn clients or discuss risks.110  To this day, Texas has no opinion 
related to the matter, causing conflict with other state ethical obligations of diligent 
representation and of confidentiality.111 
After this opinion, a barrage of data privacy laws have been passed around the 
world.  These laws, not even considered in 1999, are now the focus of entire books, 
classes, conferences, and training programs.112  Massachusetts implemented a 2010 data 
privacy law with exacting requirements for “personal information” of Massachusetts 
residents in any jurisdiction.113  Though the requirements are not technology-specific, 
practitioners have interpreted them to require encryption of data and correspondence 
containing personal information.114 The ABA International Privacy Law Working Group 
has posted guides to the FTC’s requirements, the Gramm Leach Bliley Act, the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the EU/US Privacy Safeharbor, 
and privacy requirements in Australia, Canada, the European Union, Finland, Germany, 
                                                 
106 ABA 99-413, supra note 5, at 1. 
107 Hricik 1998, supra note 4, at 471–2. 
108 Hricik 2005, supra note 6, at 283 (“In addition, while an on-line ISP could, theoretically, read every 
single message sent within its system, it is unlawful to do so.  Under federal law, a provider of electronic 
communications services may intercept messages only if it is ‘in the normal course of his employment.’”). 
109 ABA 99-413, supra note 5, at 8 (“Moreover, federal law imposes limits on the ability of OSP 
administrators to inspect user e-mail, irrespective of the OSP's formal policy. Inspection is limited by the 
ECPA to purposes ‘necessary to the rendition of services’ or to the protection of ‘rights or property.’  
Further, even if an OSP administrator lawfully inspects user e-mail within the narrow limits defined by the 
ECPA, the disclosure of those communications for purposes other than those provided by the statute is 
prohibited.”) 
110 Delaware Ethics Op. No. 2001-2 (2001); Florida Ethics Op. No. 00-4 (2000); Hawaii Ethics Op. No. 40 
(2001); Maine Professional Ethics Commission, Opinion 195 (2008);  Ohio Ethics Op. 99-2 (199); Utah 
State Bar, Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee, No. 00-01 (2000); Virginia Ethics Op. No 1791 (2003). 
Los Angeles County Bar Assn. Formal Opn. No. 514 (2005) (“Lawyers are not required to encrypt e-mail 
containing confidential client communications because e-mail poses no greater risk of interception and 
disclosure than regular mail, phones or faxes.”) 
111 See Tom Mighell, The Cyber-Ethical Criminal Defense Lawyer: Or, How to Not Commit Malpractice 
With Your Technology, TEX. BAR J. (2010). 
112 See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBURG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (2003).  
Information for practitioners can be found at the ABA Legal Technology Resource Center, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/. 
113 Rodney S. Dowell, Data Privacy I: Complying With New Regulations to Keep Confidential Personal 
Information Protected, MASS. BAR ASS’N LAWYER’S J. (2010). 
114 Rodney S. Dowell, Data Privacy II: Lock It Down, MASS. BAR ASS’N LAWYER’S J. (2010). 
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Greece, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.115  In February 2012, the ABA adopted 
a resolution that local courts should “consider and respect, as appropriate” foreign data 
privacy laws in civil litigation.116  Any attorney dealing with sensitive information should 
be aware of the large and growing body of data privacy laws. 
B. State Bar of California, Formal Opinion 2010-179  
 
In 2010, the State Bar of California issued a thoughtful, generally applicable 
opinion, alongside local bar associations issuing their own specific opinions.117  The State 
Bar of California 2010-179 Formal Opinion is a dialogue on the risks of email and other 
technologies such as wireless networks.118  This opinion is recognized as the authority on 
the issues of wireless computing for attorneys.119  The California Formal Opinion is 
based on a scenario involving an attorney with a firm-maintained laptop using a public 
wireless connection, or his own personal wireless system at his home. 
The opinion starts with a warning that technology-based ethics opinions will 
become outdated before examining the issues carefully.120  The State Bar of California is 
intentionally opaque about technology, suggesting it is a fact-specific inquiry that will 
depend on many factors, and also that it will change.121 The opinion outlines six factors 
for attorneys to consider.122 
First, the California opinion weighs the attorney’s own ability to “assess the level 
of security afforded by the technology.”123  These factors include consideration of how 
the technology differs from others, whether reasonable precautions may increase the level 
of security, and limitations on who can access the communications.124  The Opinion notes 
that this is an inquiry that requires technical knowledge and finds that attorneys owe 
clients a “basic understanding of the electronic protections afforded by the technology 
they use,” even seeking outside advice to do so.125  This technology knowledge is critical 
to allow the attorney to make an informed decision and consider the technical factors 
demanded by the Opinion.126 
The remaining five factors are the legal impact of third-party access, the 
sensitivity of the information, possible impact of inadvertent disclosure on privilege or 
confidentiality, urgency, and client’s instructions.127 
To address the hypothetical scenario, the committee finds that the attorney can 
use the firm laptop for confidential information because of the restricted access to 
                                                 
115 American Bar Association House of Delegates, Resolution 103 (2012) 
http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/committees/industries/information_services_technology/privacy.shtml 
116 http://www.abanow.org/2012/01/2012mm103/ 
117 Kristina Horton Flaherty, Ethical Issues Bedevil Lawyer E-Mail, CAL. BAR J. (2001). 
118 State Bar of California, Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal 
Opinion 2010-179 (2010) [hereinafter California 2010-179]. 
119 Ben Kerschberg, Your Ethical and Legal Dutues When Using Wireless Networks, FORBES (December 
21, 2011). 
120 California 2010-179, supra note 112, § 1. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. § 3. 
123 Id. §3(a). 
124 Id.  
125 Id. §3(a)(iii). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. §3(b)–(f). 
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appropriate authorized agents at the firm, including other personnel trained in this area.  
However, the court finds that he should not use his personal wireless network without 
“appropriate security features.” 
He may need encryption, firewalls, or other security features to use the public 
network, or “avoid using the public wireless connection entirely,” depending on the 
information’s sensitivity. 128 In all situations, the opinion requires attorneys to inform 
their clients of the risks of technologies. 
The advice to protect confidential information on a public and attorney’s own 
home router is based on illegal, “hacker” interception into systems as well as the easily-
intercepted unencrypted data transfer.129  This access is either clearly illegal, such as a 
hacker stealing information from the router, or questionably legal, such as access by the 
hotspot owner with clear privacy policies.  In either context, the California Bar 
Association nevertheless finds an ethical duty for attorneys to avoid or mitigate the risk. 
The California Opinion shows the danger of technology-specific ethics opinions.  
The ABA’s 1999 opinion’s specific combination of privacy policies, technology, and law 
may collapse when technology changes.  In this case, carelessly sending unencrypted 
email to a public server, which violated no duty in 1999, becomes an unacceptable risk 
when combined with a new, technical security risk, a public wireless router.  Unlike the 
ABA, the State Bar of California places an explicit duty on attorneys to stay informed 
about the technologies and to be able to explain risks.  
 
C. 2011 ABA Formal Opinion 11-459 
 
In 2011, the ABA responded to issues with privilege and ethic duties in employee 
email and issued a Formal Opinion 11-459, warning attorneys to advise client to avoid 
workplace email and computers.130  In this opinion, the ABA carved out a specific 
exception to its previous 1999 opinion.   This is an excellent start toward security and 
email and acknowledges serious risks with corresponding with clients using their 
employer’s resources.  Employees and their attorneys should never assume an 
expectation of privacy in work email. 
Employers have long used email monitoring to monitor everything from work 
activities to company regulations extracurricular behavior for all levels of employees.  
Email was used to fire a chief executive of Boeing was fired when email showed an affair 
with a subordinate, as well as language inappropriate under company policy.131  Many 
companies spell out that email belongs to the employer not the employee.132  Many 
employee contracts and user agreements specifically show employees that their email and 
                                                 
128 Id. at 7, n.20–21.  
129 Id. at 7, n.20–21.  
130 American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal 
Opinion 11-459 (2011) [hereinafter ABA 11-459]. 
131 Jared Sandberg, If Monitoring Workers, Why Not Include Top Brass?, WSJ Online, 
http://www.careerjournal.com/columnists/cubicleculture/20050519-cubicle.html 
132 NANCY FLYNN & RANDOLPH KAHN, E-MAIL RULES: A BUSINESS GUIDE TO MANAGING POLICIES, 
SECURITY AND LEGAL ISSUES FOR E-MAIL AND DIGITAL COMMUNICATION (2003) 
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use of the employer network is not private.133  A 2002 report to Congress of Fortune 500 
companies found that every company stored both business and personal employee email, 
over 40% routinely monitored it, and the remaining companies inspected it when 
needed.134  Some companies use software to search for keywords and evaluate email.135   
 In recent years, courts have battled through the issue of workplace email, finding 
very serious waivers associated with clients using workplace email and workplace 
computers as well as maintaining privilege despite employer policies.  The opinions show 
a case-by-case battle, muddling through privacy issues in email, sometimes deferring to 
the employer’s policies, and sometimes not. 
 Early opinions favored employers.  At the time of the 1999 ABA opinion, 
employers had been virtually undefeated in courts, obtaining rights to emails and other 
employee communication.  At the time, a commenter in the ABA Journal analogized 
invasive employer email snooping to installing a camera in the men’s room.136  Courts 
consistently found that employee emails were subject to interception and adverse use. 
In 1996, a Pennsylvania court found that even if the court had found an 
expectation of privacy in threatening an vulgar emails sent using an employers email 
address and network, that interception was not a substantial and highly offensive invasion 
of privacy.137  In 1998, an Illinois court upheld a client of Andersen Consulting divulging 
Andersen’s emails sent over the client’s mail system to the public, via the Wall Street 
Journal.138  Two unpublished California cases also recognized the rights of an employer 
to intercept and use email, even with California’s unique privacy laws.139  By the late 
1990s, it seemed employees had no statutory remedy for employer snooping on their 
email.140 
 Later, some courts did protected employee emails on a case-by-base basis, 
especially with unclear privacy policies or efforts by employees to maintain privacy.  
New York courts protected a limited amount of material sent through a personal email 
address was not waived when the employee attempted to remove the material from an 
employer’s laptop,141 as well as an employee using personal email at work.142   
Massachusetts courts protected well-labeled documents on a company laptop, as well as 
email sent through a personal email address, even when company policy warned about 
employee privacy.143  A District of Columbia District Court even protected a Department 
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of Justice prosecutor, using his work email address for personal, attorney-client 
communication, based on his ignorance of the Department policies and attempts to delete 
the mail.144 
 Other cases found sweeping waivers of privilege because of an employee’s use of 
company email and company equipment.  Widely followed cases decided in 2006 and 
2007 enforced employers’ terms of service and allowed not only interception but adverse 
use against employees.  In Scott v. Beth Israel Medical Center,145 a physician had 
corresponded with his personal attorney using the hospital’s network.  The hospital 
policy stated that all messages were property of the hospital and that no personal use was 
allowed.146  The New York trial court found that these policies diminished any 
expectation of confidentiality, allowing the hospital to use those emails in a later suit 
claiming wrongful termination.147 
 In Kaufman v. Sungard Investment Systems, a New Jersey court applied New 
Jersey privilege law to emails sent on a company email system.148  In that case, the policy 
warned: 
 
The Company has the right to access and inspect all 
electronic systems and physical property belonging to it. 
Employees should not expect that any items created with, 
stored on, or stored within Company property will remain 
private. This includes desk drawers, even if protected with 
a lock; and computer files and electronic mail, even if 
protected with a password.149 
 
The company also warned that it “reserves the right to monitor and inspect network or 
Internet usage and e-mail” and “e-mail may be subject to monitoring, search, or 
inspection at any time.”150  Under New Jersey law, disclosure to a third party “without 
coercion and with knowledge of his right or privilege” waives the privilege.151  The court 
found that disclosure to an employer by using an employer’s email system was deliberate 
and waived privilege.152 
In 2011, two cases decided within months of each other reached radically 
different about privilege in emails sent by personal attorneys to employer-provided 
networks.  In Holmes v. Petrovich, an employee used her work email and computer to 
communicate with her attorney about a work dispute. 153  The court easily found that 
these emails were not privileged, comparing it to “consulting her attorney in one of [her 
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employer’s] conference rooms, in a loud voice, with the door open, yet unreasonably 
expecting that the conversation overheard by [her employer] would be privileged.”154 
At the same time, in Stengart v. Loving Care, Inc., a New Jersey court found that 
emails sent with a personal, Internet-based email account from a work terminal remained 
privileged, with an unclear employer policy about privacy in such situations.155  In that 
case, an attorney had used a work computer to access a personal, password-protected 
email service.  The Court found that the employee was “unsophisticated in the use of 
computers and did not know that [her employer] could read communications sent on her 
Yahoo account.”156 
Further, the court found an ethical violation with the intercepted messages.  These 
messages were recorded in temporary storage on the laptop’s hard drive, in a “cache” 
folder, without the employee’s knowledge.157  The employer forensically recovered and 
used their contents claiming they were “left” on the laptop. 158  The Court found that the 
attorneys who discovered these messages violated their ethical duty by not treating them 
as “inadvertent” disclosures and notifying opposing counsel.159 
In response to this conflict, the ABA issued two opinions based on the same fact 
pattern, resembling Holmes and Stengart.   The ABA issued Formal Opinions 11-459 and 
11-460, to address concerns with client communications and also how to treat recovered 
documents in 2011.160  The ABA described the status of the law as “evolving” and stated 
courts have reached “different conclusions.”161 The formal opinions are based on the 
same hypothetical situation:  a client seeking counsel in an employment dispute, where 
waiver through use of the employer’s resources is clearly problematic.162  She has a 
company laptop assigned for her exclusive use. 163   Employees regularly use their laptops 
for personal email, even though the company has a right of access to any information on 
the laptop. 164  Opinion 11-459 addresses the issues with the client using her work 
computer and email address; Opinion 11-460 addresses the duties of the attorney 
regarding the contents of the laptop, containing privileged information. 165  
Opinion 11-459 takes on the issues of privacy in employee email.  Employers 
regularly require employees to waive privacy rights in employer email and devices.  The 
ABA notes danger when an employer can freely view confidential information, as well as 
the risk of third-party subpoenas for the employer’s stored data.166  The ABA finds that 
an attorney should assume employers can access emails sent to a workplace email 
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address, as well as private mail accessed on a workplace device, threatening 
confidentiality and possibly privilege.167 
The ABA warns attorneys about employer’s restrictive privacy policies, and 
advises attorneys to assume that employees have contracted away their expectation of 
privacy in employer emails and devices.  Given the risk of access by others and possible 
waiver of privilege, attorneys should “typically” advise his client to avoid workplace 
email and all workplace devices.168  Appropriate actions would include refraining from 
sending email to a workplace email address, as well as cautioning the client against using 
the workplace email or a workplace device to communicate, “at least for substantive e-
mails with counsel.”169 The ABA’s conclusion is as follows: 
 
Whenever a lawyer communicates with a client by e-mail, 
the lawyer must first consider whether, given the client’s 
situation, there is significant risk that third parties will have 
access to the communication.  If so, the lawyer must take 
reasonable care to protect the confidentiality of the 
communications by giving appropriately tailored advice to 
the client.170 
 
Formal Opinion 11-460 settles that Model Rule 4.4, related to inadvertent 
document disclosure, does not apply in this context.   “[A] document is not ‘inadvertently 
sent’ when it is retrieved by a third person from a public or private place where it is 
stored or left.”171  The opinion does acknowledge that other ethical or evidentiary rules 
might govern in a particular jurisdiction.172 
The ABA’s scenario contains an obvious conflict, because the employee’s dispute 
is with the party that controls the email.  The ABA warns in this context that “even 
seemingly ministerial communications involving matters such as scheduling can have 
substantive ramifications.”173  The ABA suggests that in other contexts, risks may vary, 
and that attorney’s should advise their client’s about the danger of third-party access to 
these communications.174   
The opinion suggests that other contexts could allow third-party access as well, 
such as a shared family computer in a matrimonial dispute, a borrowed computer, or a 
public computer, including a library or hotel computer.175  Though these situations are 
obviously problematic to privacy, the ABA does not offer specific guidance for these 
situations.  The ABA does not mention any technical solution, such as encryption, in the 
context of third-party access, nor discuss the attorney’s duty to understand technology.  
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The ABA’s newfound concern about privacy policies in employer networks 
updates the broad assumptions in the 1999 opinion.  In 1999, the ABA did not even 
consider the policies of a “private system,” instead worrying about careless misdirection 
within the system, such as “throughout a law firm.”176  The ABA had previously assumed 
that messages on a private network would relate to a common entity, because private 
networks contained only users with a duty to that common entity.177  Thus, all the users 
within the firm would have a common duty to the confidences of the firm clients.  The 
2011 opinion showed a world in which the network’s common duty fails to match the 
content of the message, that is a private network message used for unintended purposes. 
The 2011 opinion was also forced to address the provider’s duty to an individual 
user’s mail.  The ABA had only considered this in the context of consumer mail and 
Internet providers. The ABA had assumed that service providers would have a duty of 
privacy to their account holders, as AOL did.  This forces a situation the 1999 opinion did 
not contemplate: the provider has no duty of privacy to its user; in fact it has contracted 
for the exact opposite. 
The ABA also reversed its position on the power of ECPA to protect email users.  
Adverse access and use of employer email or private mail accessed on an employer’s 
device would be impossible under the ABA’s 1999 opinion, which claimed that 
inspection and disclosure were prohibited by federal law “irrespective of the OSP’s 
formal policy.”178  All relevant provisions of ECPA contain exceptions for consent, so the 
OSP’s formal policy is critical.  Thus, The ABA reconsidered in 2011, finding the 
employer’s policies are able to override the federal law it previously trusted. 
In 1998, Professor Hricik compared email to a package sent through a commercial 
service, such as Federal Express, which warns in fine print that they can inspect any 
package.179 He claimed that obtaining informed consent before using FedEx was 
unreasonable, and compared FedEx’s rights to an OSP’s “limited right to monitor 
lawfully e-mail.”180  As time went on, courts found that providers could contract for their 
right to monitor, assuming policies were clear, at least in the case of employers. The 
privacy policy would now control that right, not ECPA.181 
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The 2011 Formal Opinion is critical because it shows that a user’s consent is able 
to override the law’s default privacy limits and to eliminate the general, assumed 
expectation of privacy.  This opinion destroys the generalized conclusions and requires 
focusing on the policies of the service provider, not the character of the technical 
specifications, as the most important element to determine user’s privacy.  Unlike in 
1999, this suggests privacy must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and that 
provider’s policies are critical. 
 
D. Proposed 2012 Model Rule Changes 
 
After years of preparation, papers, and comments, in February 2012, the ABA 
Commission on Ethics 20/20 released a final revised draft of the commission’s proposals 
for submission to the ABA House of Delegates in August 2012.182  The relevant 
proposals include amendments to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1, Competence, 
Rule 6, Duty of Confidentiality, and Rule 4.4, Respect for the Rights of Third Persons.183 
The most fundamental proposed amendment is to the Rule 1.1, Competence, 
Comment 6, Maintaining Competence.  Previously the comment required attorney to 
“keep abreast of changes in law and practice.”  The proposed amendment adds “including 
the benefits and risks associated with technology.”184  This mirrors the California 
requirement that attorneys must be knowledgeable about technology in order to inform 
clients of risks or obtain consent.  The Committee describes this requirement as “some 
awareness of the basic features of technology” and notes that the amendment “does not 
impose any new obligations on lawyers.”185 
Rule 1.6, Confidentiality, has a proposed change, adding a section (c): “A lawyer 
shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or 
unauthorized access to, information relating to representation of a client.”186  This rule 
has an intuitive quality that makes one wonder why it was previously relegated to 
Comment 16 for disclosure by an attorney or his agents, or to Comment 17 for 
transmissions only.  Obviously, it is illegal to break into a law firm and steal documents, 
but shouldn’t an attorney at least lock the door?   The Committee describes this rule as 
needed “in light of the pervasive use of technology to store and transmit confidential 
client information.”187 
The Committee describes three scenarios that encourage adoption of Rule 1.6(c): 
misdirection of email, hackers accessing client data, and employee agents posting 
confidential information on the Internet.  This rule is intended “to make clear that lawyers 
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have an ethical obligation to make reasonable efforts to prevent these types of 
disclosures, such as by using reasonably available administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards.”188  The Committee declined to offer technology-specific recommendations 
in the rules, instead outlining general principles. 
The Committee adds a lengthy provision to Comment 16.189  The Comment 
clarifies that inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure is not a violation if “the lawyer has 
made reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure.”  This analysis uses four 
factors: sensitivity of the information, likelihood of disclosure without security measures, 
cost of security measures, and the extent to which the safeguards would affect the 
lawyer’s ability to represent clients.  However, the Committee leaves the bulk of 
Comment 17 unchanged.  Comment 17 applies to “transmitting a communication” and 
states that “[t]his duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special security 
measures if the method of communication offers a reasonable expectation of privacy.”190 
Comments 16 and 17 add notes that federal and state privacy laws are beyond the 
scope of the rules, and that lawyers may need to take additional steps while 
communicating information and after unauthorized access.  The Committee added these 
statements to “remind lawyers that other laws and regulations impose confidentiality-
related obligations beyond those that are identified in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”191 
Rule 4.4, Respect for Rights of Third Persons addresses an attorney’s duty to 
notify a sender of inadvertent document disclosure.  The amendments add “electronically 
stored information” to the previous “documents.”192  Proposed amendments to Comment 
2 defines electronically stored information as “email and other forms of electronically 
stored information, including embedded data (commonly referred to as “metadata”), that 
is subject to being put into readable form.”  “A document of electronically stored 
information is inadvertently sent when it is accidentally transmitted to an unintended 
recipient, such as when a letter is misaddressed or when a document or electronic stored 
information is accidentally included in discovery.”193  As before, Rule 4.4 requires 
attorneys to notify the sender, but other requirements will vary.  The Committee 
describes this information as “intentionally sent, but to the wrong person.”194 
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The Committee also recommends that the ABA sponsor a centralized website to 
host the many resources and projects the ABA has undertaken regarding technology in 
law practice, including data security standards.  The ABA has several resources with 
information on these issues, including the ABA Legal Technology Resource Center.  The 
Committee found that practitioners sought a central location for this information.195 
The ABA proposals are much-needed amendments to the Model Rules, including 
a critical provision requiring attorneys to maintain knowledge of technology.  The 
proposed amendments reflect the need to protect electronic communications, just as paper 
documents, and to consider the risks for confidentiality in use of technology. 
 
III. Continuing Privacy Issues 
 
Years after the ABA’s confident conclusion that the existing law protected 
privacy in email identically to other means of communication, and that interception was 
difficult and illegal, the issue remains unresolved.  Privacy in email has eroded in at least 
one category, employer mail, and remains in flux generally speaking.  Email forces a 
case-by-case inquiry because email can have clear policies about expectations for users, 
as the ABA acknowledged in 2011.  Attorneys should be wary of this uncertainty, of the 
danger of privacy policy waivers, and of unrelated disclosure to third parties in 
compliance with other cases. 
 
A. No Settled Expectation of Privacy in Email 
 
The general expectation of privacy in email in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
remains unresolved.  Though expectation of privacy is not identical to confidentiality, the 
concepts are related and courts often rely on Fourth Amendment protections to analyze 
confidentiality. 
When analyzing expectation of privacy in a Fourth Amendment context, courts 
consider whether an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy and whether 
society would consider that expectation reasonable. Email has found itself at a rough 
intersection between fundamental search and seizure principles:  the generalized, person-
based Katz inquiry of reasonable expectation of privacy, the “third party” doctrine of 
Miller and significant statutory challenges, with outdated, unclear guidance from 
Congress. 
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court changed the dialogue about the 
Fourth Amendment with a new test. 196 Instead of focusing on the object searched, the 
Court turned to the target, developing the “reasonable expectation of privacy test,” as 
developed in Justice Harlan’s dissent and subsequent cases.  This analysis, now used in 
all Fourth Amendment inquiry, asks whether a subject has an actual expectation of 
privacy (subjective prong) and whether society considers it reasonable (objective 
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prong).197  The subjective prong requires an intent to keep the information private as well 
as reasonable efforts to maintain privacy.198 
In United States v. Miller, the Court established the third party rule, finding a 
subject forfeits privacy in information known to and divulged to a third party.  Miller was 
contesting a subpoena for bank records, which the Court found were “revealed to a third 
party,” thus the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit disclosure to government 
authorities.199  “All of the documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit 
slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their 
employees in the ordinary course of business.”200  Depending on the facts and the steps 
taken by the parties, third-party access can also destroy confidentiality, for example 
documents that could have been, but were not, inspected by an accountant.201 
The conflict of Katz and Miller is ongoing in this context.  Email is technically 
accessible by third parties, ISPs, yet resists easy classification as information freely given 
to others.  Email also has its own very complicated set of privacy policies and obsolete 
statutes.  This issue is surprisingly unsettled, and is the subject of much commentary and 
speculation.202  Today, only one published, federal appellate opinion addresses the issue 
of general privacy expectations in email, over ten years after the ABA confidently 
established privacy interest in email.203 
The unlikely hero of email privacy has become Steven Warshak, infomercial 
peddler of the erectile dysfunction drug “Enzyte” and star of an episode of CNBC’s 
dramatic “American Greed” featuring elaborate financial scams.204  In 2005, federal 
agents investigated Warshak’s company, Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc.  As part 
of that investigation, the government requested email from Warshak’s Internet service 
provider, NuVox, and an email account supplied by that company, as well as email 
provided by Yahoo for Warshak and others.205 
Federal agents used an order authorized by ECPA, the Stored Communications 
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), to order NuVox to preserve all incoming and outgoing mail.206  
Warshak accessed his mail by downloading it to his personal computer and deleting it 
from NuVox’s servers; without this order no copies would exist.207  The government then 
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obtained a subpoena using ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), for disclosure of the 
information.208 NuVox was required to surrender 27,000 emails.209 
In 2008, Warshak went to trial with several others on a 112 count indictment for 
the fraudulent activities of the company.  Warshak was convicted of most counts and 
sentenced to 25 years imprisonment, and fines and forfeitures of over a half-million 
dollars.210  The government used many of Warshak’s own documents, including his 
emails, but did not use any privileged materials.211  During the trial, Warshak’s motion to 
exclude the emails was denied.212  The Sixth Circuit had found a privacy interest in the 
emails before the trial, but the opinion was vacated for being unripe.213  After the trial 
ended, Warshak again appealed the government’s warrantless seizure of his emails to the 
Sixth Circuit. 
The Sixth Circuit opinion is thoughtful and aware of its novel precedent, written 
by Justice Boggs.214  The Sixth Circuit used broad strokes in an overview of general 
Fourth Amendment principles, with no real precedent in this area.  It starts with a Katz 
inquiry as to whether Warshak had an expectation of privacy in his email and whether 
that expectation was reasonable.215  The Court finds that Warshak “plainly manifested an 
expectation that his emails would be shielded from outside scrutiny” based on their 
content.216  The Court found the emails were “often sensitive and sometimes 
damning.”217  The Court found this expectation on the content alone, and did not consider 
any technological protections for this expectation.  The Court did not even mention, for 
example, password protections on the account. 
For the second prong of the Katz inquiry, the Court was forced to decide whether 
society would find a privacy interest in email as reasonable.  The Court was well aware 
of the impact of this decision, calling it “of grave import and enduring consequence, 
given the prominent role that email has assumed in modern communication.”218  The 
Court starts by noting that the Fourth Amendment must keep pace with technology and 
that surveillance through technology requires Fourth Amendment safeguards. 
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The Court analogizes email to both phone conversations and sealed letters, both 
with well-established reasonable expectations of privacy.219  The Court finds similar 
sensitive communication, similar technological risk, and historically found that the email 
search is protected by the Fourth Amendment.220  Though the Court found the search was 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment, it did not exclude the evidence because agents 
relied on ECPA in good faith.221 
The Court distinguished Warshak’s emails from Miller based on their content.  
Unlike in Miller’s banking requests, in the ordinary course of business, Warshak sent 
“confidential” communications.222  The Court also distinguished that NuVox was the 
“intermediary, not the intended recipient of the emails.”223  In this case, NuVox provided 
Warshak’s Internet connection as well as his email address,224 as opposed to an ISP 
which only provides Internet access.  Both Warshak’s and Nuvox’s actions made NuVox 
more of an intermediary than an endpoint.  If Warshak had not deleted mail from the 
server, or if NuVox had always preserved emails, NuVox would have been a storage 
facility for Warshak.  In that situation, labeling the provider as simply an intermediary is 
more challenging. 
The Court used strong quotes from other sources about recognizing privacy in 
email: recognizing “eliminate the strangely disparate treatment of mailed and telephonic 
communications on the one hand and electronic communications on the other”; “a search 
of [an individual's] personal e-mail account” would be just as intrusive as “a wiretap on 
his home phone line”; and “[t]he privacy interests in [mail and email] are identical.”225  
The opinion, however, was significantly tempered. 
The Court was forced to address NuVox’s policies, that is “NuVox may access 
and use individual Subscriber information in the operation of the Service and as 
necessary to protect the Service.”226  The Court also noted Nuvox’s practice that it did not 
keep copies of emails once downloaded onto account holder’s computers.227  The Court 
avoids the Federal Express analogy and instead compares this to the policy of a hotel.  
Even though staff often enter hotel rooms, and have the ability to enter a room, guests 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.228  The Court finds that “some degree of 
routine access is hardly dispositive.”229 
The Court finds that Warshak was protected by NuVox’s policies that it would 
access emails only under limited circumstances.230  Recognizing the importance of 
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NuVox’s policy, the Court states “we are unwilling to hold that a subscriber agreement 
will never be broad enough to snuff out a reasonable expectation of privacy.”231  The 
Court cited to a decision in which an employee had no right of privacy in files on his 
office computer, and another in which a university had much less restrictive privacy 
policy.232  An intention by an ISP to “audit, inspect, and monitor” might negate a user’s 
expectation.233  Thus, The Court engaged in a subtle, case-specific inquiry, suggesting 
that the privacy policy is critical to this distinction. 
Of course, the Court here is speaking about a reasonable expectation of privacy 
from government searches and from the government compelling the ISP to turn over 
information, not from the ISP itself.  The Court cites experts in the field, Professors 
Patricia Bellia and Susan Freiwald, concerning the role of the ISP as intermediary in this 
transaction.  They compare the ISP to a case in which “a third party carries, transports, or 
stores property for another.”234  This is satisfying in the context of warrantless 
government searches, but perhaps not for confidentiality.  In the article cited by the 
Court, Bellia and Freiwald continue and explain the expectation of privacy with respect 
to the ISP itself:  
 
To be clear, users may lack a reasonable expectation of 
privacy with regard to those third party intermediaries who 
discover information in the course of exercising their 
rightful access to the users’ packages, storage lockers, 
rental properties, or stored e-mail accounts. That implies 
that if the third party chooses to disclose the information so 
discovered to the government without requiring a warrant, 
the user cannot complain. When the user assumed the risk 
that the intermediary would discover incriminating 
information or property in the course of its business, she 
also assumed the risk that the intermediary would choose to 
turn that information over to the government. If the user 
mistakenly trusted the intermediary to protect its 
incriminating information, there is no reason for the Fourth 
Amendment to protect that misplaced trust. 235 
 
 Bellia and Freiwald suggest a service provider less protective than NuVox which 
may turn over information without being compelled by the government.  This brings to 
mind the long line of cases in which criminals mistrusted third parties who then turned 
over communications to the government.236  Service providers may also be that unreliable 
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third party which turns over information to law enforcement.  Bellia and Freiwald’s 
article suggest that a cooperative ISP would have the right to voluntarily turn over 
information, at least under the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but the government 
would still need to obtain a warrant to compel disclosure. 
 In their brief to the Court, the professor amici, including Bellia and Freiwald, 
argued: 
 
Terms of service set forth the ways in which a service 
provider may need to protect its system and business from 
fraud, hacking, unauthorized use, and the like. Whatever 
rights the service provider might have to access 
communications to perform those functions, those rights do 
not give the service provider the right to disclose 
communications for the fundamentally different purpose of 
assisting law enforcement investigations of unrelated 
crimes. . . .  
 
Notwithstanding its terms of service, a service provider's 
right to protect its own property does not release the 
Government from the constraints of the Constitution. Any 
third party that holds property on behalf of another, such as 
a storage company, may retain the right to inspect units to 
prevent damage that might occur to its property or that of 
other customers. The fact that the storage company has or 
exercises such a right, however, says nothing about the 
relationship between the storage customer and government 
agents.237 
 
 Though these policies were not at issue in this cases, providers often do have such 
provisions, allowing ISPs to voluntarily disclose under certain conditions to third parties, 
including the government,  Service provider policies usually explicate reasons ISPs can 
disclose communications, including criminal activity or emergencies, in part to be able to 
comply with mandatory reporting laws.238  Service providers are required by law, for 
example, to report known child pornography, subject to stiff fines.239  In this case, NuVox 
did not invoke such a provision, but ISP policies regularly allow for disclosure to others 
in certain situations.240 
 Because NuVox did not assert it, the brief did not consider whether violation of 
terms of service, such as committing a crime through NuVox’s service, would forfeit 
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Warshak’s right of privacy, with respect to both the ISP and the government.241  This 
broader issue, though not at issue in this case, could have widespread consequences in 
Fourth Amendment law and in confidentiality. 
 Bellia and Freiwald’s general deference to ISP policies regarding privacy is 
consistent with recognizing ISP rights, established by the policies and contracts.  The 
Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Warshak can only be compatible with established employer’s 
rights if the user can waive his rights by agreeing to the policy.  The distinction between 
NuVox, which resisted accessing and disclosing communications, and an employer, who 
intentionally stored and used communications adversely, is the provider’s policies. 
 In the context of confidentiality, Warshak may offer false reassurance for 
attorneys, as the landmark case offering a headline-worthy “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” in email, as Professor Hrick’s 1998 article did as well.  Comment 17 to Rule 1.6 
allows attorneys to communicate with no security precautions if the medium “offers a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.”242  At least for the Sixth Circuit, Warshak’s Fourth 
Amendment holding shows a reasonable expectation of privacy from the government 
alone, not third party ISPs.  ISP access, as a private party, does not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Confidentiality is concerned with more than just government access; 
attorneys must consider access by non-governmental third parties, including ISPs.  For an 
expectation of privacy from ISPs, users must consult their policies. 
 
B. Read Your Privacy Policy Lately? 
 
 Perhaps the elephant in the room in the court opinions, bar association opinions, 
academic discussion, or any discussion about email privacy at all is the case-specific 
inquiry of the provider’s policies: user agreements, terms of service, usage policies, and 
privacy policies.243  Even if there might be an expectation of privacy, that expectation can 
be contracted away by the user.  In all cases, reasonable expectation of privacy will 
depend on the provider’s policies. 
Professor Hricik believed users can rely on the privacy of their email by contract 
and that attorneys should inspect the privacy policy of their service provider.244  This 
policy should set some rights to mail which Hricick assumes will further protect users’ 
privacy, relying on the then-robust AOL privacy policy.  Professor Hricik treated his 
email, while waiting to be downloaded to its final resting place at his computer, as 
property in bailment, subject to a contract.245  The ABA agreed, citing ISP policies as a 
key factor in maintaining privacy within a network, limiting even legal access, without 
                                                 
241 Brief for Professors, supra note 215, at 17, n.12.  
242 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 17 (2009). 
243 Mike McNerney, Warshak: A Test Case for the Intersection of Law Enforcement and Cyber Security, 
2010 U. ILL. J. L. TECH & POL’Y 345, 351 (2010) (“Practically speaking, adjudicating cases such as these 
on a case-by-case basis isn’t very satisfying.  Outside of basic subscriber information, it seems hard to 
believe that the Fourth Amendment should only apply in so far as an ISP user agreement.”) 
244 Hricik 2005, supra note 6, at 282–83. 
245 Hricik 1998, supra note 4, at 490 (“Assuming the provider is according e-mail content reasonable 
security from its employees, e-mail should be deemed to be secure because it is similar to files stored at an 
off-site storage facility.”) 
 34
citing a single privacy policy.246  This assumption about privacy policies is obsolete, as 
acknowledged by the ABA in 2011. 
Privacy policies are now longer, meaner, and more vague since Hricik’s articles. 
The assumed privacy protections are now hazy or even hostile to privacy interests, and 
the assumed practices to keep email confidential will obviously depend on the privacy 
policy.  Today’s user should be very concerned about the case-specific policies relating to 
email.  Privacy policies, such as employer policies discussed above, may offer no privacy 
at all. 
Professor Hricik confidently relied on the AOL Privacy Policy, as an example of a 
service provider dedicated to privacy.  This policy has been updated several times in the 
past years, always acting retroactively.  In 1997, AOL’s privacy policy promised to delete 
mail within 25-30 days, and explicitly promised confidentiality.247  While that 1997 
privacy policy is reassuring, the 2012 AOL privacy policy is more hazy, and much, much 
longer.  It states, in part: 
 
The contents of your online communications, as well as 
other information about you as an AOL Network user, may 
be accessed and disclosed in response to legal process (for 
example, a court order, search warrant or subpoena); in 
other circumstances in which AOL believes the AOL 
Network is being used in the commission of a crime; when 
we have a good faith belief that there is an emergency that 
poses a threat to the safety of you or another person; or 
when necessary either to protect the rights or property of 
AOL, the AOL Network or its affiliated providers, or for us 
to render the service you have requested.”248 
 
AOL, like all providers, can also monitor for violation of the Terms of Service: 
 
 To prevent violations and enforce this TOS and remediate 
any violations, we can take any technical, legal, and other 
actions that we deem, in our sole discretion, necessary and 
appropriate without notice to you. 
 
The AOL Terms of Service require users to comply with many vague 
requirements, including “[c]omply with applicable laws and regulations and not 
participate in, facilitate, or further illegal activities” and not use sexually explicit 
speech.249  AOL maintains its general focus on user privacy and limits access and 
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disclosure to business purposes, legal process, and issues such as furtherance of crime or 
an emergency.  Of course, this assumes the mail complies with the terms of service. 
The issue of whether a user forfeits an expectation of privacy when he violates 
terms of service is unclear.250  Certainly, an employee violating a policy of no personal 
use was considered in the case of employer mail.251  AOL does not describe violation of 
terms of service as an enumerated category subject to disclosure, but AOL does reserve 
the right to “any technical, legal, and other actions” for violations of terms of service.252  
Where the policy was previously black and white, the new AOL policy contains areas of 
gray. 
ISPs may offer no privacy at all.  Beyond employer networks, there are many 
large networks, in which users may contract away their expectation of privacy.  Public 
sector emails are subject to become public documents, as we all have seen with constant, 
high-profile disclosures of inappropriate emails as public documents.  In 2007, D. Kyle 
Sampson, then chief of staff for Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez resigned after emails 
became public showing plans to remove certain U.S. Attorneys.253  Harris County District 
Attorney Chuck Rosenthal also resigned when his emails showed an improper 
relationships and racially derogatory content.254 
Emails held by public entities, including public universities, are at risk to become 
public documents under open records and freedom of information laws.255 These laws 
generally exempt privileged information, but not the broader category of confidential 
information.  Further, the entity reviewing for exceptions may not have the same interests 
as the communicating parties. Thus, when a public entity, including a university or law 
clinic, discloses documents, its privilege review can be very challenging, based on the 
reviewer’s attorney status and relationship to the attorney-client communications.256 
Public university legal clinics have a uniquely difficult burden with freedom of 
information laws.  Rutgers Law School, a public New Jersey university, recently 
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challenged their responsibilities under the New Jersey Open Public Records Act.257  
Rutgers argued that the disclosures would put the clinics at a disadvantage, compared to 
private legal services, because their files may be subject to disclosure.258  In 2010, a New 
Jersey Court found the law applied to the Rutgers legal clinic as to any other state-funded 
program, as written, with the “specifically delineated twenty-one exemptions.”259 The 
New Jersey law provides exemptions for information that must be produced, including 
attorney-client privilege, and specific types of information, such as social security 
numbers and driver’s license numbers.260  These exceptions would likely not apply to 
many documents actually requested in the case: time records for attorneys and staff, 
payment records, minutes of meetings, and broad categories of documents.261  Public 
disclosures, such as those required in New Jersey, can be troubling for attorneys’ ethical 
standards and for maintaining client confidence.  Professor Gregory Sisk claims these 
disclosures “would likely prevent clinics at a public university form continuing to 
represent clients.”262  Rutgers’ Acceptable Use Policy was amended after the decision to 
add a privacy exception for information subject to the New Jersey Open Public Records 
Act.263 
In 2010, Professor Sisk and Nicolas Halbur published a thoughtful discussion of 
university privacy policies within the context of clinical work by law school faculty 
members.264  They found universities often have counterintuitive policies, restrictive for 
institutions thought to encourage a protected space for free thought and speech.265  Most 
universities provide some privacy for users, requiring exigency or some judgment call to 
prompt inspection of a user’s information.266  However, a “significant minority … begin 
from the stated premise that users of computer systems are not guaranteed or should not 
expect privacy.”267  This departure from traditional expectations in email, or even as 
compared to commercial email service providers, is critical. 
Kansas State University’s privacy policy states that all users, including employees 
and students, have “no expectation of privacy” in anything on the university network.268  
Villanova School of Law, a private school, agrees, stating, “[w]hile the Law School 
attempts to keep email messages secure, privacy is not guaranteed and users should have 
no general expectation of privacy in email messages sent through the Law School 
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system.”269  These policies are problematic for attorney’s expectation of privacy and 
contradict the basic principles of a university’s unique setting, valuing privacy and 
academic freedom.270 
An attorney inspecting these terms of service should be cautious about sending 
sensitive information, encrypted or not, to a network with no reasonable expectation of 
privacy. These network owners, like employer owners of private networks providing 
email to employees, could not be more clear about the terms of their proprietary network, 
and there is no room to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy with such a clear policy 
explaining otherwise.  These policies are a grave risk for client’ private information as 
well as an attorney’s reputation and ethical standards. 
The Villanova School of Law policy mirrors the less private undergraduate 
policy, attached to Villanova’s assignment of university-affliliated Gmail accounts, 
which appear to be from @villanova.edu, but are served in part by Google.271  “While the 
University will make every attempt to keep email messages secure, privacy is not 
guaranteed and users should have no general expectation of privacy in email messages 
sent through a University Email Account or through a Gmail Account.”272  Villanova 
University is an early adopter of Google’s “Google Apps,” which includes cloud based 
services targeted at universities.273  In this case, Villanova’s privacy policy clearly 
conflicts with Google’s generally privacy-focused policies, though carrying Google’s 
branding.  In such a case, users need to be aware of their privacy policies, which may 
require investigation. 
Others, such as University of North Carolina, may appear to be hold the same 
intent, but more vaguely.  “[T]here is no guarantee of privacy or confidentiality for data 
stored or for messages stored or sent on University-owned equipment.”274  This “no 
guarantee” could be a statement about technical vulnerability; we all know nothing is 
guaranteed in security.  However, this acceptance of limited rights may also be 
considered a waiver.  An attorney should carefully consider staking his professional 
ethics on such vague policies. 
Most university policies contain exceptions that allow university administrators, 
such a provost or a vice-president, the ability to inspect emails.275  Yale’s policy allows 
access with approval by the Provost and appropriate Dean for faculty, or the appropriate 
Dean for students.276  Professor Hricik’s current institution, Mercer University, allows 
even more access: 
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Systems support staff, systems operators, supervisors, and 
designated University officials may access information 
resources to locate and protect business information, 
maintain system and network resources, ensure system and 
network security, provide technical support, comply with 
legal requirements, or administer Mercer University 
policies.”277 
 
Many universities have similar policies that allow high-ranking, non-attorney 
administrator access, with or without some form of cause.278 
In the context of attorney-client email, non-lawyer access could be problematic 
for confidentiality as well as for an attorney’s ethics obligations, which require attorneys 
to supervise all non-attorney access.279  Attorneys have an ethical duty to make sure their 
systems staff are appropriately trained to maintain confidences.280  These university terms 
allow a stranger to the attorney-client relationship access to privileged material, without 
the required attorney supervision.281   
This relationship is challenging because though the university appears to be a 
private, secure network, it is not subject to the same security and confidentiality risks that 
attorneys must consider when establishing networks handling confidential information.282  
Unlike users of the law firm’s network, the university does not have a common 
relationship to the clients.  Instead, the information is at risk by an authorized, unrelated 
party with no relationship whatsoever to the attorney-client relationship. Well-crafted 
university policies would require, at a minimum, a review for privileged information by 
an attorney with no conflict of interest.283 
Students also have a problematic relationship with their university privacy 
policies.  In Reichert v. Elizabethtown College, a Pennsylvania district court easily 
reached the conclusion that a university’s inspection of a student’s email in the context of 
an expulsion dispute was not a violation of privacy, ECPA, SCA, or state wiretap laws.284  
The court did not even examine the college’s privacy policy, as the student’s email was 
provided by the college.285  This court treated the student much more like an employee 
than a paying customer. 
 Even for providers generally focused on privacy, it is important for attorneys to 
read the terms.  Gmail’s recently revised Google Privacy Policy adds changes an attorney 
should consider: 
 
We may use personal information to provide the services 
you've requested, including services that display 
customized content and advertising.  
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We may also use personal information for auditing, 
research and analysis to operate and improve Google 
technologies and services.  
We may share aggregated non-personal information with 
third parties outside of Google.  
When we use third parties to assist us in processing your 
personal information, we require that they comply with our 
Privacy Policy and any other appropriate confidentiality 
and security measures.  
We may also share information with third parties in limited 
circumstances, including when complying with legal 
process, preventing fraud or imminent harm, and ensuring 
the security of our network and services.  
Google processes personal information on our servers in 
the United States of America and in other countries. In 
some cases, we process personal information on a server 
outside your own country.286 
 
This Privacy Policy is upfront and clear and shows Google’s dedication to privacy in 
most circumstances, but it adds another wrinkle: explicit acknowledgement that 
confidential information might be leaving the country where another jurisdiction’s laws 
apply. 
 Google’s transparency is refreshing compared to general silence about the 
location of your data, but should raise questions about other providers’ terms for storage 
and for processing private information.  AOL may store information offshore as well, but 
may not even notify you. Many users, and thus their attorneys, may be completely 
ignorant of where their data is being stored.  Villanova’s Gmail-serviced accounts may be 
on servers in Pennsylvania, they may be on Google servers in California, and they may 
be somewhere else completely.  In state-specific inquiries, such as privilege, 
confidentiality, and ethics, the location of this information could be critical, especially 
with less privacy-focused providers than Google. 
Other privacy policies have a host of terms that may or may not support a finding 
of privacy.  These policies can contain all sorts of terms.  For example, Yale requires 
users to decrypt encrypted messages on request and staff must have approval to send any 
encrypted mail.287  Yale prohibits everything from “chain letters” to “reckless distribution 
of unwanted mail” to “harassing or threatening uses” as violations of the network’s 
terms.288 
AOL and Google attempt to be straightforward and transparent about their 
policies.  However, other providers’ policies can be flung across several documents.  
Yale has over a dozen documents on the main “Policies, Procedures, and Guidance” page 
for all kinds of technology policies as well as unlinked, isolated documents, such as 
Procedure 1607 PR.01, which contains specific technical guidelines to allow Yale to 
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decrypt all encrypted mail.289  Simply finding a provider’s complete policies could be 
quite an endeavor, if possible at all. 
Just these few privacy policies raise serious questions about what kind of 
expectations are reasonable for users.  Attorneys should look for clear explanations of 
when the ISP can access information itself, and when it can disclose it to others.  It may 
be unreasonable for some users to have any expectation of privacy at all.  The ABA 
draws great comfort from privacy policies, which could protect messages, but could just 
as easily contract away any expectation of privacy. 
 
C. The Enron Problem – Discovery & Disclosure 
 
Attorneys sending information to third party servers just don’t know where they 
will end up.  Hackers aside, there are many venues for legal disclosure at the hands of a 
third party.  The Federal Energy Resource Commission (FERC) confiscated Enron’s 
Microsoft Outlook database as part of its investigation into Enron’s illegal activities.  It 
then took an unprecedented step to comply with its FOIA responsibilities.  On March 23, 
2003, the FERC published 1.6 million emails, calendar entries, and tasks, sent to and by 
176 former and current Enron executives and employees.290  Importantly, not everyone in 
the corpus was an Enron employee, such as Kenneth Lay’s daughter Elizabeth, or 
Enron’s outside counsel.  These senders lost privacy interests by sending to Enron’s 
network. 
The set of data, later known as “The Enron Corpus,” was originally released in 
full, until unwitting participants objected to releasing private mail. 291  The corpus was 
taken offline for ten days, and FERC used a keyword filter looking for things like 
divorce, social security numbers, removing parts of the corpus assumed to be the most 
private, though not necessarily the most embarrassing, mail.292  During that ten days, 
FERC claimed it responded to claims of attorney-client confidence in the corpus.293 
The Enron Corpus, freely available at the FERC website,294 still contains email to 
in-house counsel and outside attorneys, many with their sad disclaimers uselessly 
attached from Vinson & Elkins,295 Skadden Arps,296 and international firms.297  Hundreds 
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of messages in the corpus are from outside or in-house counsel, including Bruce 
Lundstrom, James Derrick, and Peter del Vecchio.  Some email even warns in the subject 
line it is privileged, for example “Subject: PPA Compliance - Attorney Client 
Privileged.” 
This very public email release shows that lawyers simply don’t know where e-
mail will end up.  For Enron’s outside counsel, their confidential email ended up next to 
Elizabeth Lay’s embarrassing comments about weddings, crunched by spam software 
vendors, pawed through by journalists and gawkers worldwide, and run in academic 
computer labs from Berkeley to MIT for projects from mail pattern visualization to social 
networking.298 The Enron Corpus is an extreme example of compromised privacy, but 
legally, it is absolutely sound, a choice in the discretion of the investigating agency 
dealing with now-public documents. 
Email will be critical in other kinds of investigations, and documents containing 
every aspect of personal and professional lives existing on a mail server could be turned 
over.299  Future corpuses could be disclosed in many other contexts, such as the White 
House’s voluntary release of emails dealing with Solyndra from inside and outside the 
White House.300  Sarbanes-Oxley requires retention of many kinds of documents for 
public companies, including emails for long periods of time.301  Attorneys must request 
that documents produced to the SEC in an SEC investigation be treated as confidential or 
they are also subject to FOIA requests.302  A third party responding to such an inquiry 
may not even know the material is privileged, or care to spend resources defending 
privilege in an unrelated matter because an unrelated attorney was careless about the 
destination of his mail. 
Email on third-party servers is also at risk for disclosure in unrelated civil 
matters,303 as the ABA warned in 2011.304  After December 2006, the Federal Rules of 
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Civil Procedure expanded electronic discovery.  The amendments changed Rule 
26(b)(2)(B)-(c) for electronic discovery requests.305  All “reasonably accessible” data 
must be provided absent a showing of “good cause.”306  If privileged information is on a 
third-party server, that third-party, with no duty to the attorney or the client, may be more 
concerned about their production requirement than potential privilege in an unrelated 
case.  When the information is on a third-party server, it may be impossible for an 
attorney to defend confidential or privileged information.   Disclosure of unrelated 
material, or a “document dump,” may even be strategic.307  This scenario is problematic 
for privacy and for privilege, especially given jurisdictional and case-by-case 
interpretations of waiver. 
When email is on a third-party server, both sender and recipient risk disclosure of 
confidential information and privilege waiver through unrelated disclosure. When the 
entire server is released, the confidential material is in another’s hands or even on the 
official record, like the Enron Corpus. 
 
IV. Finding Solutions 
 
“[I]t is not asking too much that if a client wishes to preserve privilege…he must 
take some affirmative steps to preserve confidentiality.”308  Every ethics opinion, court 
case, and academic recognizes that attorneys should use their judgment, and that there are 
situations when an attorney needs to use caution.  Technology-based solutions may be the 
best practice available and part of reasonable measures to preserve confidentiality. 
 
A. Technology-Based Solutions 
 
In networked systems, no one security measure can offer security, and no network 
can have perfect security.309   I discuss one method of technological protection for email, 
encryption, as only part of a larger plan of best practices.310 However, all encryption 
systems can theoretically be broken or can be implemented incorrectly.311  Thus, I speak 
about encryption as a best practice only, not as failsafe protection. 
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Encryption guards the contents of an email from any third party, including an 
intercepting party or a third party accessing the stored messages.  Thus, a copy of 
encrypted email in the hands of a third party, even a user’s ISP, is useless.  Public key 
cryptography uses pairs of keys, with one widely distributed “public key” that is not 
secret and corresponding “private key” that only its owner holds.312  Users can use the 
public key to send messages that only the private key can read, and the private key sends 
messages that only the private key owner can send.  Users can exchange their public keys 
and transmit using public keys in otherwise insecure environments, but use private keys 
to decrypt.313 
 Email encryption on a mail client can be more difficult to use than, say, a secure 
webpage.  In 1999, a study evaluated naïve users’ use of a new email encryption system 
for Macintosh computers.314  Of the twelve participants, four were able to send properly 
sealed mail, and only one could complete all the tasks the authors consider minimal 
encryption procedures. 315   This level of failure posed a serious risk to the entire system 
in the authors’ view.316   
Since that time, major mail clients have all embedded encryption support.317  
These programs have increased usability with simpler interfaces, automatic unsealing, 
and better error messages.  Many of the failures in the study, such as sending a message 
without the appropriate keypair, are impossible in many modern applications.  In a 2005 
study repeating the 1999 study, most of the 14 lay participants were able to use Microsoft 
Outlook’s encryption features functionally.318   
As with all new technologies, lawyers can be trained to adapt.319  In part, thanks 
to HIPAA, encryption solutions for email are now commercially available for small 
business networks, and even for services like Gmail.320  Today, implementing email 
encryption is not the barrier it once was. 
 
B. Technology-Based Solutions as Reasonable Measures 
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Encryption may a part of best practices for protecting a message from a third 
party.  Even if encryption is not failsafe, encryption is a good way for attorneys to use 
technology to clearly explicate their expectation of privacy in sensitive data.  Encryption 
may be an actual barrier to interceptors, legal or otherwise.  Encryption is also a clear 
marker of who is authorized to read a confidential communication. 
Common sense tells all attorneys that there is some information that probably just 
should not be in email, or some that is sensitive enough to require special effort.  For 
example, law firms dealing with information such as pending mergers know to have a 
“healthy paranoia” about this highly sensitive information.321  Health professionals and 
finance professionals face similar issues with highly confidential information.  Health 
professionals have a great deal of experience implementing these systems after health 
care privacy laws, mainly HIPAA, which while not technology-specific, has far greater 
restrictions than legal standards.322 
Common sense also tells attorneys that information in danger of harmful 
interception should be protected, whether that interception is legal or not. “Even if 
interception is illegal, if it is easy to intercept messages, the law is of cold comfort to 
clients and counsel.”323  This situation might be true for divorce documents accessed on a 
shared computer, the public wireless router at the coffee shop, or other situations where 
the email might be subject to adverse interception, legally or illegally. 
Technical solutions may work.  Today’s encryption takes significant resources to 
break.324  Technologists predict that in a matter of years, routine matters may use 
virtually unbreakable encryption.325  Even if the law or the privacy policy may not protect 
your communication, encryption may.  Even an authorized snooper may technically fail 
at attempts to intercept messages. 
Encryption is also a very clear label about expectations of privacy.  Encryption 
may be insufficient in the Fourth Amendment context to legally protect in the context of 
law enforcement decrypting a message already accessed.326  However, in the context of 
confidential attorney-client communications, encryption is a clear message that an 
attorney has made efforts to conceal the communication.  In the context of 
confidentiality, encryption easily analogizes to whispering in a courtroom hall to prevent 
others from overhearing the messages.  This effort may be meaningless to a Fourth 
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Amendment inquiry, but does show efforts to maintain confidentiality between attorney 
and client. 
Like opening a sealed Fed Ex package, decrypting an encrypted email requires 
affirmative action to violate what has been sealed, in spite of its labels of intended 
recipients.  This action may change the ethical requirements for inadvertent 
communications, and may show that the mail was not intended for third-party 
consumption.  In ABA Opinion 11-460, the ABA refused to consider unencrypted emails 
abandoned on an employer’s system as inadvertent disclosures, but encrypted emails 
carry their own clear message about confidentiality.  An attorney encountering encrypted 
data would face a challenging technical and ethical dilemma. 
Technology-based solutions will change over time, and will solve only current 
issues, but they will remain part of best practices to address some security issues.  
Informed attorneys need to be vigilant about learning about new risks and finding 




Privacy expectations in email now depend on case-specific variables.  Attorneys 
must be aware that these expectations may vary depending on local data privacy laws, 
privacy policies, and the devices used to access information.  Using email for confidential 
or privileged communication requires an attorney’s judgment, along with the client’s 
informed consent.   
Attorneys need to discuss email’s risks with clients to mutually create a solution 
for that client’s needs. Obviously, security needs will vary based on content and based on 
the client.  But even the most benign content, such a scheduling email sent to an 
employee’s email, may be devastating to a client.  Before an attorney can make such a 
judgment call, he needs to understand the risks involved and discuss them with his client.  
Clients must work with their attorneys to decide what precautions are appropriate, as it 
will be the client filing the grievance. 
Both attorney and client levels of sophistication may vary; some clients may 
demand security measures or have their own policies for securing data.327  Some law 
firms have the best security measures in the world and the personnel and training to 
enforce it.  Unsophisticated clients may have no knowledge about security for sensitive 
emails or technology skills at all.  Smaller practices may be less equipped to understand 
the risks involved in evolving technologies. 
Attorneys need to first educate themselves and consider their security policies and 
whether they know their policies truly safeguard client’s confidential information.  
Attorneys should consider policies about encryption and also about acceptable email use.  
When using third-party email services, attorneys should consider privacy policies and 
what types of data are appropriate to send to those systems.  Attorneys should make sure 
mail storage, including on their portable devices such as smartphones and laptops, 
complies with their ethical obligations.328 
                                                 
327 Martha Neil, Corporate Clients Should Ask Specific Questions About Law Firm Security, Experts Say, 
ABA J. (2012). 
328 Poje, supra note 254, at 17-18. 
 46
Attorneys must be able to educate their clients about the risks of technology they 
choose to use, including the risks of using third-party services to do so.  When an 
attorney or his firm is unable to understand the risks, or if the burden of this education is 
too severe, email may not be the proper medium to communicate with clients.  
Technology-based ethics opinions can never be the solution for long, and it is dangerous 
to rely on their assurances.  In a world with a battery of data privacy laws, evolving 
ethical guidance, and lengthy privacy policies, an attorney may wish to err on the side of 
caution, instead of risking his professional license on technology he does not understand. 
